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Representations, identity and resistance in communication  
Caroline Howarth 
 
Key terms 
 
Social Representation: A system of common values, ideas and practices that enable people to 
understand each other and communicate about similar issues. It also involves a degree of 
subjective interpretation that leads to differences in understanding, different readings of texts 
and therefore the motivation to communicate. Representations may be hegemonic, negotiated 
or oppositional.  
 
Encoding-Decoding: A circular process by which mass communication is imprinted with 
meanings (codes) and read through the meanings salient to different audiences. There is often a 
‘lack of fit’ between the processes of encoding (or the production of communications) and 
decoding (the reception and interpretation of communications. Both processes feed into, and 
sometimes challenge, each other. Encoding-decoding occurs in different communicative genres: 
 Diffusion: the anchoring of the unfamiliar into familiar knowledge in an seemingly neutral 
manner, characterised by sceptical intelligence  
Propagation: the association of the unfamiliar to particular beliefs, established by central 
authorities (such as the church)  
Propaganda: the ideological manipulation of new ideas to support and defend the political 
interests of a particular group (such as a political party).  
 
Ideology: A system of hegemonic representations that sustain the dominant cultural order. Here 
it is more useful to examine the ways in which communicative practices operate ideologically 
through the systematic manipulation of knowledge in the service of power and the defence of 
unequal social relations.  
 
Culture: Often taken to mean a broad collection of values, ideas and practices (that is a network 
of representations) that define a particular group or community, such as the British community 
or a student community. Culture is something produced in and struggled over in communicative 
practices.  
 
Cultural difference: The ideological construction of differences between cultures. This frequently 
invites stereotypes about ‘us’ and ‘them’ and evaluations that present certain cultures as 
superior. In practice when we examine cultural differences we often find that there are more 
similarities than differences across cultures, and therefore it is difficult to separate cultures as 
distinct.  
 
Identity: An individual’s sense of who they are in relation to others around them. This 
simultaneously incorporates a sense of belonging and shared knowledge and a sense of 
difference and individuality. Different forms of identity and so different types of social groups 
lead to different communicative genres.  
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Resistance: The ways in which communicative exchange enables dominant representations to be 
challenged, rejected or transformed, for example through the articulation of oppositional 
representations. Here we are interested in Social Psychological change and so examine the 
psychological processes that enable resistance (e.g. representation) and the communicative 
genres that also may facilitate resistance (e.g. particular community dialogues). 
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Representations, identity and resistance in communication  
 
“We cannot communicate unless we share certain representations”  
(Moscovici and Marková, 2000, p. 274). 
 
Representations sometimes call our very identities into question. We struggle over them because 
they matter – and these are contests from which serious consequences can flow. They define 
what is ‘normal’, who belongs – and therefore, who is excluded” (Hall, 1997, p.10).  
 
Our identities, the ways we see and represent ourselves shape how we communicate, what we 
communicate about, how we communicate with others and how we communicate about others. 
Hence identity, representation, culture and difference are all central to a Social Psychology of 
communication. Take culture: Germans and Greeks differ considerably in the amount of small 
talk in business discussions, which is seen by Greeks as important to building up relationships 
(Pavlidou, 2000). American English speakers tend to be talkative and inquisitive in conversations 
with people they do not know well, and relatively quiet in the comfort and intimacy of close 
relationships, while the reverse is true for Athabascan Indians (Tracy, 2002). Added to such 
cultural differences are communication patterns relating to gender (Duveen and Lloyd, 1986), 
religion (Miike, 2004), class (Skeggs, 1997), language and dialect (Painter, 2008), amongst others. 
What’s more, it is very difficult to untangle the intracultural nature of identity and how this 
impacts on communication (Martin and Nakayama, 2005). Hence communicative exchanges are 
“deeply cultural”, as “groups of people will speak and interpret the actions of those around 
them in patterned ways” (Tracy, 2002, p. 34). One of the questions for a Social Psychology of 
communication is: Do such cultural patterns facilitate or obstruct communication? (see box 7.1).  
 
Box 7.1 
 
Do cultural differences facilitate or obstruct communication?  
Communication is often studied with reference to intercultural differences, that is 
communication between people from different national and linguistic groups. Hence the fact 
that there ‘are’ different cultures - distinct and discrete, relatively homogenous cultures that 
can be defined against one another is taken for granted in much work on communication. 
Following an encoding-decoding model (Hall, 1980, detailed below), for example, messages are 
seen to be encoded in the symbols and nuances of one culture which may not be accessible for 
someone from another culture. As Porter and Samovar (1988, p. 21) explain: 
When a message reaches the culture where it is to be decoded, it undergoes a 
transformation in which the influence of the decoding culture becomes a part of 
the message meaning. The meaning content of the original message becomes 
modified during the decoding phase of intercultural communication because the 
culturally different repertory of communicative behaviour and meanings possessed 
by the decoder does not contain the same cultural meanings possessed by the 
encoder. 
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Culture informs the ways we think and act in relation to everything – even the ways in which we 
think about communication. Hayakawa (1978) for example, points out how communication is 
represented in Western cultures, where the listener is often positioned as subordinate to the 
active and independent speaker. In other cultures where collective understanding is more highly 
valued than individual success, there are not so much different roles of the speaker and the 
listener, but rather a joint enterprise for meaning, empathy and building connections with 
others (Fitch, 1998). It is very important that we bear this in mind when doing research into 
communication. The social sciences as a whole but especially anthropology and cross-cultural 
psychology have in fact fuelled a whole communications industry that examines, records and 
advises on cultural difference – what to do where, how to act, how to please, how to do 
business, how to negotiate, how to order from a restaurant menu, et cetera (Bennett, 1993). 
Clearly there are different cultural practices across all sorts of located and virtual social 
encounters and such knowledge can be enormously helpful, as detailed in chapter 3.   
 
However such intercultural texts, albeit produced with the best intentions and sometimes 
acclaiming the importance of inter-cultural respect, may often be “somewhat inclined toward 
stereotyping, occasionally given to exaggerating cultural differences” (Hannerz, 1999, p. 398), 
offer one-dimensional accounts of culture that downplay the interconnections between culture, 
gender, class and history, and possibly endorse ideologies of prejudice (Orbe, 1998). In many 
settings such claims of cultural difference attract an array of obstacles to successful 
communication, namely overstated assertions of difference/similarity, states of anxiety about 
difference and prejudiced attitudes (as already described in chapter 3). Representations of 
‘other cultures’ often impose homogenising claims of how ‘our culture’ is compares (favourably) 
to others (Hall, 1997), while talk about ‘our culture’ may do symbolic violence to the identities 
and practices of minoritised groups (Orbe, 1998).   
 
Once we accept the diversity and ongoing transformation within all cultures, it becomes very 
difficult to speak of ‘different cultures’ very meaningfully (Howarth, 2009a).  However, as the 
literature demonstrates (Martin and Nakayama, 2005), there clearly are various cultural 
practices, forms of identity, different social groups and relations of power that do lead different 
forms of communication. But rather than examine different ‘cultures’, I suggest we see culture 
as something that we do through systems of representation, rather than something we have. In 
this way we can now examine how all cultures change and transform, meet and merge with 
others, clash and crystalise into distinct and sometimes hostile factions and contain competing 
representations, interests and voices. We then begin to see communication as a political 
struggle (Hall, 1981) or cultural negotiation (Holliday et al, 2004), a way of presenting and re-
presenting cultural knowledge in a ongoing system of negotiation – though we are not all 
positioned equally in this dialogue, as is evident when we consider representations of ‘race’ 
(Hall, 1988, 1997; box 7.2).   
 
 
Hence we need to examine the ‘patterned ways’ of speaking, interpreting and acting and so 
explore the relationship between communication and identity. Interestingly, in two distinct 
disciplines, theories of representation have emerged as a means of examining such patterns in 
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communication, and connections between communication, identity and resistance. In Social 
Psychology this is Social Representations Theory (SRT), as developed by Serge Moscovici 
(1961/2008); in Cultural Studies this is the extensive work of Stuart Hall (1980, 1988, 1997).  
 
SRT has been described as a theory of communication since its inception. Indeed, as Duveen 
(2000) has pointed out, “representations may be the product of communication, but it is also 
the case that without representation there could be no communication” (pp. 12-13). 
Representations (as common structures of knowledge and social practice produced in social 
psychological activity) can only exist in communication through the development of shared 
systems of values, ideas and practices; and social representation (as a psychological process that 
is at once cognitive and cultural) is only possible through the communication of emergent and 
relational identities, shifting claims to difference and claims to commonalities. SRT studies make 
use of many different communicative genres: everyday talk, narratives, scientific discourse, 
media images, historical documents, institutional practices, cultural artefacts, advertising 
posters,  and even drawings and weavings.  
 
And yet, SRT does not offer a precise theory of communication per se. Rather it is a theory 
about the role of representations in communicative practices, particularly in the transmission of 
knowledge and the presentation of identities. This is valuable for a Social Psychology of 
communication as it highlights the simultaneously ideological and collaborated nature of 
communication, the relationship between communication, difference and identity, and the 
possibilities for resistance and transformation within communicative exchange. It is in though 
studying SRT that we learn about these aspects of communication, with a particular focus on 
the social psychological processes involved. However, by incorporating the work of Hall, as we 
do below, we are able to develop a much more compelling account of the politics of 
communication, consider the ideological role of the media and other public institutions in the 
development and dissemination of representations, and possibilities for resistant identities to 
emerge in communicative practices. Hall (1997) describes his approach as: 
more concerned with the effects and consequences of representation – its 
‘politics’. It examines not only how language and representation produce 
meaning, but how the knowledge which a particular discourse produces 
connects with power, regulates conduct, makes up or constrains identities and 
subjectivities, and defines the way certain things are represented, thought 
about, practised and studied (p.6). 
 
Hence an ‘articulated’ account of representation that draws on both SRT and Hall proposes a 
more political psychological version of communication than either theory provides alone1. 
Furthermore it demands an integrated focus on what Moscovici and Marková (2000) call the 
primary genres of communication (everyday debate and conversation) and secondary genres of 
communication (mass communications, institutionalised discourses and so forth).  
 
                                                 
1
 Hall refers to ‘articulation’ as a practice of bringing together different theoretical frameworks in order to move 
beyond the limits of either theory on its own.  
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What is the relationship between representation and communication?  
Social representations are “systems of values, ideas and practices with a two-fold 
function: first, to establish an order which will enable individuals to orient 
themselves in their material and social world and to master it; and secondly to 
enable communication to take place among members of a community by providing 
them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying 
unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual and group 
history” (Moscovici, 1973, p, xiii). 
 
From this widely cited definition, we see that representations “provide collectivities with 
intersubjectively shared means for understanding and communicating” (Duveen and Lloyd, 1990, 
p. 2). Because they are the codes we use to explain the past and the past is always changing to 
accommodate the present and support ambitions for the future, these codes (and the identities 
they support) are always in a process of transformation (Hall, 1988). Moscovici first employed 
the term social representation to distinguish the concept from Durkheim’s (1898) notions of 
collective and individual representations. For Durkheim a collective representation is a ‘social 
fact’ which is imposed on us, difficult to challenge, uniform and coercive in its effects. Social 
facts are more common in traditional societies, where there is comparative uniformity in belief, 
knowledge and communicative practices. In contemporary society, different knowledge systems 
(relating to science, religion, health, economics, politics and so forth) compete in diverse 
settings. As a result there is more critique, argument and debate and so less stability in 
knowledge and communication. Most collective representations have now fragmented under 
these pressures, giving birth to more dynamic, unstable and oppositional representational fields 
(Hall, 1980). Under the pressures of globalisation, meanings become highly contested and 
negotiated, as Lewis (1994) recognises: 
Meanings becomes a battleground between and among folk cultures, class 
subcultures, ethnic cultures, and national cultures; different communications media, 
the home, and the school; churches and advertising agencies; and different versions 
of history and political ideologies. The sign is no longer inscribed within a fixed 
cultural order. The meaning of things seems less predictable and less certain. ( p.25)  
 
Or simply as Hall (1997) has put it, “meaning floats. It cannot be finally fixed” (p. 228). Hence 
the process of representation in and of itself invites social and psychological change. As 
Philogène’s (2001) research demonstrates “social representations are vectors of change, 
because they are the medium by which we communicate new situations and adjust to them” (p. 
113). Representation is something we do in order to understand the worlds in which we live and, 
through communicating our understanding, we convert these systems of values, ideas and 
practices into a social reality, for others and for ourselves. In this process the idea or practice 
may be confirmed or perhaps re-articulated in some way (Hall, 1980). And representation is not 
something we do independently as thinking individuals, but something that is always a 
relational, collaborative and deeply political process evident in “thinking societies in clubs, 
museums, public libraries, political libraries, cafes, economic or political associations, ecological 
movements, medical waiting rooms, therapy groups, adult education classes” (Moscovici, 2001, 
p. 12). Hence the process of communication encourages both change and stability, resistance 
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and containment in the genesis of knowledge (Hall, 1981), as we see in both primary 
communicative genres (everyday debates and conversations) and secondary communicative 
genres (in mass communications and scientific debates, for instance).  
 
Communication across science, the media and the everyday 
Moscovici’s own classic study of the circulation of knowledge about psychoanalysis in media and 
everyday discussions is generally seen as the communication of scientific knowledge into 
popular discourses. This can easily be related to Hall’s model of encoding-decoding. This 
presents a powerful critique of theories that characterise mass communication as a transparent 
and straightforward system of inscribing and discovering the intended meaning in discourse, 
where audiences read off the intended meaning in media texts for example (Hall, 1980). Hall 
demonstrates the ‘lack of fit’ between the circular process of encoding (by producers and 
reporters) and the decoding (by audiences) and the ways in which this opens up possibilities for 
polysemic values and oppositional accounts to develop. In a similar way, various studies using 
SRT examine “how science manages to become part of our cultural heritage, of our thinking, of 
our language and daily practices. … by leaving the labs and publications of a small scientific 
community to penetrate the conversation, the relationships, or the behaviour of a large 
community and to get diffused in its dictionaries and current reading matter” (Moscovici, 2001, 
p. 10).  
 
This is often described as the relationship between the reified world of science, where 
representations are encoded, and the consensual world of everyday conversations and 
commonsense, where representations are decoded. Just as Hall critiques studies that present 
this as a one-way process from encoding to decoding, we need to be critical of SRT studies that 
only examine the transmission of science into the everyday (Batel and Castro, 2009). Just as for 
Hall’s encoding-decoding model, we need to see these worlds (of science and the everyday) as 
intimately connected and reactive to each other. Hence we also need to examine the impact of 
everyday knowledge on scientific discourse (Howarth, 2009b). As we see in this chapter (e.g. 
box 7.2), SRT studies have examined the construction and communication of different identities 
– in children’s stories, institutionalised practices, and school curricula, for example. We may still 
find that certain representations become reified as normative beliefs and practices, but that the 
relationship to science is much less specific. What may be more productive to a Social 
Psychology of communication is an analysis of the processes of reification and consensualisation 
(Howarth, 2006a). In a similar way to Hall this would allow us to examine the ways in which 
representations become systemically distorted and naturalised in the maintenance and defence 
of the dominant cultural order.  
 
Box 7.2 
 
Community dialogues and challenging representations that ‘race’.  
The relationship between identity, difference and resistance has been at the centre of my own 
studies on racialised identities. Drawing on both SRT and Hall, I have looked at the role of ‘race’ 
in young people’s efforts to assert and communicate positive cultural identities (Howarth, 
2002a). In particular I have examined the impact of racism on children’s sense of self, of 
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community and culture (Howarth, 2006b). I have shown how ‘race’ may limit identities – 
restricting one’s sense of possibility and of ambition, and how such representations may be 
communicated and institutionalised within the symbolic culture of schools (Howarth, 2004). In 
being seen in a particular way, for example, as black, brown or mixed, pupils are positioned as 
different, as other and, often, as less than in contexts of intellectual achievement and learning 
(Howarth, 2007). These contemporary racist stereotypes remain tied to our history of colonial 
relations, slavery, the denigration and economic exploitation of particular cultures and the 
maintenance of white privilege and hegemony (Hall, 1997). Because these “are widely known 
and shared in the culture, or among the stigmatized, it is not necessary for a prejudiced person 
to communicate the devaluation of the stigmatized for that devaluation to be felt” (Crocker, 
1999, p. 103). Such representations, then, are ideologically constructed, communicated and 
resisted in systems of difference and privilege that constitute and communicate the social 
norms and consensual beliefs of a culture. Once again, we see that values, ideas and practices 
are communicated symbolically – through the media, material culture, social spaces, embodied 
practices and so forth. Very little may be actually said for racialising stereotypes to be felt.  
 
This research into ‘race’ highlights the symbolic violence of communicative exchanges that 
marginalise, stigmatise and exclude others. I have also found that it is in supportive collectivities 
and community dialogues where such negative experiences can be discussed that identities are 
debated, defended and sometimes re-made. Children and teenagers in educational and 
community groups, often with the explicit aim of challenging prejudice and spoilt identities, 
collaborate innovative ways to problematise racism, disrupt its gaze and so rupture its hold over 
their identities (Howarth, 2004; see also chapter 2). The opportunity for communicating one’s 
experiences of identity and racism and developing a sense of relationship and community can 
provide the social support and psychological resources to re-construe threats to identity 
(Howarth, 2009b). Thus, we can see how particular communicative practices both assist and 
challenge ideologies of prejudice, such as racism or sexism.  
 
Both SRT and Hall assert that communication is both normative yet transgressive, individual yet 
shared, prescriptive yet malleable. Representations, as Abric has described, are both 
“consensual but marked by strong inter-individual differences” (1993, p.75). Hall has also 
explored the deeply ideological and restrictive nature of representations and also their very 
agentic and transgressive nature. How do we explain this contradiction? Abric (1993) suggests 
that in communication it is not all of a representation that is open to elaboration, development 
or contradiction. There are different constituents: the core and periphery. The core of a 
representation is the ‘heart’, the fundamental elements of a representation “determined by 
historical, sociological, and ideological conditions” (p.74). It is “stable, coherent, consensual and 
historically marked” (p.76). It resists change and is relatively continuous and consistent. The 
periphery is more responsive to the communicative exchanges within which it occurs. Peripheral 
elements are open to challenge and revision, and are “flexible, adaptive and relatively 
heterogeneous” (p.77). Hegemonic representations, similar to ideologies, are comparatively 
unchanging over time and so are almost completely dominated by the central nucleus of ideas. 
Other representations, particularly those that oppose the dominant order, are more contested 
and so more reactive to the peripheral elements. 
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These include what Moscovici defines as emancipated and polemical representations. The 
former “are the outgrowth of the circulation of knowledge and ideas belonging to subgroups”, 
separate from the main spheres of public debate. The later are “generated in the course of 
social conflict, social controversy and society as a whole does not share them” (Moscovici, 2000, 
p. 28).2 In a similar way Hall distinguishes between dominant-hegemonic (also ‘preferred 
meanings’), negotiated and oppositional readings. The former are obviously akin to hegemonic 
representations in that they saturate commonsense and support the dominant cultural order. 
Negotiated readings are more complex as the reader/viewer has the potential to adopt and 
oppose dominant discourses more in line with local conditions and so are comparable to 
emancipated representations. Finally oppositional readings, related to polemical 
representations, but are in direct opposition and critique to mainstream beliefs and discourses.  
 
What is also common in these accounts is a focus on the cultural embeddedness and multi-
accentuality of representations, highlighting their polysemic (Hall) or polyphasic (Moscovici) 
nature. Hall draws on Bakhtin (1981) and Volosinov (1973) to highlight the ways in which 
meanings are ‘accented’ by those who speak them, historically and contextually continguent 
and characterised by oppositional meanings and contradictions. As described above, there is 
always a ‘lack of fit’ or a tension between the processes of encoding and decoding, which fuels 
debate, argument, opposition and resistance. Moscovici, also influenced by Bakhtin,  takes this a 
little further: while there is always such a lack of fit between intended meanings and 
interpretations in the process of representation at the level of thinking societies, there may also 
be a ‘lack of fit’ between the representational systems of thinking individuals. Hence 
ambivalence, tension, contradiction, what Moscovici terms ‘cognitive polyphasia’ exists both at 
the level of psychology and at the level of culture; both in terms of what individuals say, do and 
think and in terms of how representations are communicated and understood more broadly 
(Wagner and Kronberger, 2001). As close reading of Hall, suggests he would have little to argue 
with here, although he would demand more analysis of the politics at stake in the polysemic 
nature of representation, as we turn to next.    
 
The politics of representation 
In using representations, we incorporate them into our current ways of understanding and 
everyday talk, through the processes of (a) anchoring and (b) objectification. Anchoring 
integrates new phenomena into existing world-views in order to make the unfamiliar familiar. 
Anchoring involves ascribing meaning to the object being represented. “By classifying what is 
unclassifiable, naming what is unnameable, we are able to imagine it, to represent it” 
(Moscovici, 1984, p.30). In the course of anchoring the unfamiliar in the familiar, 
representations are modified. An informative example of anchoring can be found in 
Augoustinos and Riggs (2007): through the analysis of everyday talk they demonstrate the ways 
in which contemporary representations of culture are anchored in “old and discredited social 
Darwinist notions of biological hierarchy” (p. 126) which present Aboriginal cultures as ‘very 
                                                 
2
 For a detailed discussion of these types of representations and illustrative examples from debates on immigration, 
see Deaux and Wiley (2007). 
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very primitive’ and white cultures as ‘modern’ and ‘advanced’.  In this way what was non-
communication (the unknown, strange and vague) becomes communication. Too often 
anchoring process is narrowly interpreted as an individual psychological process (Howarth, 
2006a); what Augoustinos and Riggs demonstrate are the ways in which this is simultaneously a 
deeply ideological process.  
 
The process of objectification produces a domestication of the unfamiliar in a way that is more 
active than anchoring because it saturates the idea of unfamiliarity with reality, turning it into 
the very essence of reality. This produces the materialisation of an abstraction. Deaux and Wiley 
(2007) provide a good example of this with reference to debates about immigration that are 
organised about the tangible metaphor of the melting pot and references to blending, mixing, 
forming and the crucible.  In this way images cease to be images or signs; they become a part of 
reality, just as ‘Dolly the sheep’ ceases to be an image of cloning but has come to embody the 
material reality of genetic manipulation (Gaskell, 2001). The media play an important role in the 
production, dissemination and debate over different representations and the images on which 
they rest (Hall, 1997) – as do all communicative exchanges “in social, scientific, political or 
religious communities, in the worlds of theatre, cinema, literature or leisure” (Moscovici, 2000, 
p. 111). Through objectification, images become constitutive elements of social and ideological 
reality, rather simply than elements of thought.  
 
These are not, then, neutral psychological processes. By classifying a person, a thing, an event, 
or a nation, we are at the same time assessing and evaluating it/her. For example, Jodelet (1991) 
found that images such as ‘decay’ and ‘going off like butter’ were common in people’s talk 
about mental illness. While this tells us something of the everyday experience and identity of 
the villagers (as close to the land and nature, Wagner and Kronberger, 2001), they also reveal 
the prejudice and fear of contagion that has been “unconsciously transmitted for generations” 
(Marková, 2007, p. 229), communicated through collective memories and ideological practices. 
Similarly in my research in Brixton, South London, for example, I have found that prejudiced 
representations of the poor and of black people are articulated with other representations of 
crime and come to form commonsense knowledge about Brixton (Howarth, 2002a). By looking 
at how dominant discourses manipulate values and ideas in the service of particular interests 
we can study the ‘ideological battle’ of representations. 
 
This relates back to Hall’s dominant-hegemonic readings or preferred meanings. Hall is 
particularly interested in the ideological role of the media in producing systems of 
representations that serve to prefer particular interests and identities over others, and so 
systematically distort particular representations and sustain systems of power and inequality. 
Hence he is interested in the ongoing ideological construction of reality. Similarly, Moscovici 
(2000) sought to answer this question: “how do people construct their social reality?” He 
continues: 
While the actor sees the problem, the observer does not see the whole 
historical solution. Marx was well aware of this dilemma when he wrote: 
‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please: 
they do no make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
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circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past’ 
(Marx, 1852/1968, p. 97).  
 
This quote connects different levels of representation: microgenesis, ontogenesis and 
sociogenesis. These are terms developed in SRT, but we can see important correlations with the 
work of Hall. Both perspectives are concerned with the microgenetic level of communication: 
communication between individual actors in particular readings, encounters and contexts. They 
both are profoundly interested in the ontogenesis of identities and the representations 
individuals have of themselves. But, crucially, for both Hall and SRT, the cultural, historical and 
ideological aspects of communicative practices, that is the sociogenetic level, frames both the 
ontogenetic and microgenetic levels. Hall (1981) illustrates this nicely in this quote referring to 
the particular media portrayal of an event:   
The choice of this moment of an event as against that, of this person rather than 
that, of this angle rather than any other, indeed, the selection of this 
photographed incident to represent a whole complex chain of events and 
meaning, is a highly ideological procedure. (p. 241).  
 
It is here, in the sociogenesis of communicative practices, where representations appear at their 
most ideological – pervading the media, social institutions, cultural arrangements, advertising 
campaigns, political discourses and so forth. This is also where we see how different values and 
practices are reified and prioritised over others, how some representations (and the social 
groups and social identities to which they relate) are marginalised and excluded from 
mainstream systems of discourse and how the process of representation supports ideological 
systems. Hence networks of representations support a priori hierarchies of knowledge, restrict 
the development of identity and sustain discourses of difference, privilege and power (Howarth, 
2004). This immediately provokes Hall’s question: “Can a dominant regime of representation be 
challenged, contested or changed?” (1997, p. 269). 
 
Resistance and identity and communicative exchange 
Hall’s question speaks to heart of representation – as it highlights the transformative nature of 
knowledge, communication and identity. This was evident in Moscovici’s seminal study of the 
image of psychoanalysis in three subcultures in 1950s Paris: “the transformation of knowledge 
as it is communicated across different groups and parts of society. … and the ways in which each 
social group reconstitutes knowledge according to its own interests and concerns” (Duveen, 
2008, p. xii). The same is true of individuals: they take up and rework, re-interpret and re-
present knowledge in a way that fits into and develops their sense of self (Howarth, 2006a; box 
7.3).  
 
Box 7.3 
Possibilities for resistance and connection in multicultural settings  
We have seen that representations of others pervade communicative exchanges. In chapter 4 
we have also seen that successful communication is based on the ability to connect with the 
other (‘dialoguicity’). This was something I have explored in research into intracultural identities 
in multicultural settings (Howarth, 2009b) – where the ability to communicate across difference 
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is central to the identity of the group and individuals in that context. The acute intersectionality 
of these communities can be seen as a resource in diverse settings and an asset to global 
communication and community-building. For example, Bennett (1993) examines the 
experiences of ‘constructive marginals’ and their efforts to transcend the confines of 
essentialised ideologies of cultural difference. What we can see from this research is that the 
ontogenetic experience of intracultural identities (such as British Mexican or British Caribbean) 
can lead to a comprehensive understanding of cultural difference – particularly an 
understanding of the (co-)production of difference and the impact on identity. Such an 
appreciation and sensitivity for the power of representations to ascribe identities, limit the 
possibilities of self and stigmatise particular communities is a valuable asset for communicating 
in multicultural settings. Indeed, some researchers have found examples in history where 
intracultural groups such as ‘Creoles’ were recognised as “astute traders with a mastery of the 
finer points of intercultural negotiations” (Bird, 2009, p. 61).  
 
In order to communicate effectively – ones needs to find some level of connection and common 
knowledge. It is vitally important in multicultural settings to have a good understanding of the 
intersubjective production of cultural difference and to know how to use difference to build 
commonalities and not obstacles in forging intracultural relationships and successful dialogues. 
This requires not simply learning about ‘others’, but learning about the processes that other. As 
Martin and Nakayama (2007) have argued, successful communication requires “the ability to 
understand what it’s like to ‘walk in someone’s shoes’” (p. 10), and to “go through the eye of 
the needle of the other” (Hall, 1988, p.30). Indeed, the more you do this, the more you learn 
about others, the more you learn about yourself; the more you realise that ‘other’ cultures are 
not so ‘other’. The more experience you have in multicultural settings the more you realise that 
all cultures are deeply complex and diverse and that all cultural generalisations are problematic. 
This leads to an understanding that all identities are also deeply complex and constantly 
changing. Thus an understanding of the essentially intracultural nature of identity is valuable for 
successful communication.  
 
 
We can also relate Hall’s encoding-decoding model and concept of articulation to Moscovici’s 
distinction between propaganda, propagation and diffusion within secondary or more 
formalised communicative genres (in mass communications and public institutions). Through his 
detailed analysis of the highly differentiated sections of the French Press in the 1950s in La 
Psychanalyse (1961/2008) Moscovici gives examples of the different ways in which 
representations are encoded and decoded within three social groups, and the different 
psychological phenomena they give rise to: stereotypes, attitudes and opinions. Most clearly, he 
shows how representations of psychoanalysis were encoded with stereotypes of American 
decadent culture and Western imperialism by Communist Party press in order to denigrate and 
reject psychoanalysis as a pseudo-science. This is propaganda. Within Communist writings 
Moscovici found that psychoanalysis is always articulated with representations of American 
bourgeois culture, creating and cementing new meanings and readings (Moscovici and Marková, 
2000) in ways that promotes and defends a commitment to Communist politics and identity. By 
contrast propagation was used in Catholic discussion to accommodate particular aspects of 
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psychoanalysis into the existing religious doctrines and so develop particular attitudes to 
psychoanalysis consistent with the authority of Catholicism. Diffusion occurred in liberal 
debates with the aim of informing public opinion. Such liberal professionals would claim a 
certain sceptical intelligence and characterise out-groups as dogmatic. As Duveen (2008) 
explains:  
What one sees in Psychoanalysis is not only the way in which distinct social 
representations both generate and are sustained by different communicative 
genres, but that these different communicative systems also reveal different 
forms of affiliation amongst the publics drawn together around each 
communicative system. (p. 371).  
 
What this suggests is that different forms of mass communication are tied to different forms of 
groups and different identity positions. In Hall and SRT we also see that it is in social interactions 
and activities, in communicating with others, that representations and identities become 
meaningful, debated, contested and transformed. This is because communication is central to 
the social psychological connections between the transmission of shared knowledge and 
individuals’ positioning in relation to this knowledge (their identities). As Kronberger and 
Wagner (2007) have argued: 
Our membership in social groups constrains the ways in which we come to 
understand an object, and conversely, by positioning oneself with regard to an 
object and by the style we communicate about it, we ascertain our belonging to 
a particular group of people, and simultaneously distance ourselves from 
others. (p. 177) 
 
This focus on identity demands a connected analysis of primary and secondary communication 
genres: everyday debate and more formalised public discourses. Identities are often described 
as the stories individuals and communities “tell themselves and which locate them in society” as 
Cieslik and Verkuyten (2006, p. 79) have put it. However, as they go on to point out, “the stories 
available to tell are not unrestricted. … Historical, social and political patterns limit and shape 
the possible group narratives or the available narrative space through which groups can manage 
and negotiate their multiple identities” (ibid).  Hence it is in communicating in its broadest sense, 
through the media, material culture and social space, social interactions and embodied 
practices that identities come alive, invite common histories to be told and establish the 
(constructed and so shifting) boundaries of culture, common identities and difference.  However, 
there are very real limits to the (co)production of identity.  
 
The huge disparities in communication mean that we are not equally positioned in producing or 
contesting knowledge about ‘us’ or ‘them’ in mainstream debates. As Moloney (2007) illustrates 
very vividly with editorial cartoons of refugees these “inequities in the media access allow for 
the proliferation of one version of events over others, which not only reproduces the identities 
of voiceless groups in society but also reconstructs them” (p. 63). And such groups do not have 
the material or cultural capital to challenge representations of them that they see as inaccurate 
or destructive: the communicative genres of propaganda, propagation or diffusion are not 
available to them. Her study gives a very fine-tuned analysis of the visual and textual codes used 
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in the media that turn indirect stigma into blatant stereotypes that produce social distance 
between “us” and “them” and demonise and dehumanise the individuals and communities so 
represented – often in quite contradictory ways. As Hall (1997) has argued such stereotyping “is 
part of the maintenance of social and symbolic order. It sets up a symbolic frontier between the 
‘normal’ and the ‘deviant’, the ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’, the ‘acceptable’ and the 
‘unacceptable’, what belongs and what does not or is ‘Other’, between ‘insiders and ‘outsiders’, 
us and Them” (p.258). 
 
And at the same time, Hall reserves a place for resistance and agency against such propaganda: 
cultural identity, he insists, “is a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as being’. It belongs to the future 
as much as to the past” (1991, p. 225). Hence identities are not merely imposed or ascribed; 
identities are also a matter of negotiation, connection, imagination and resistance. As Duveen 
(1994) asserts, “the circulation of representations around the child does not lead to them being 
either simply impressed upon the child, or simply appropriated by the child, rather, their 
acquisition is an outcome of development” (p. 112). Even in the face of negative stereotypes of 
self, there are the possibilities of resistance and social creativity as we find ways to co-construct 
and communicate more positive versions of self, community and culture (Tajfel, 1978). This 
means that there is room to debate, resist and potentially transform stereotypes and practices 
that other and exclude (through a process of conscientisation for example, see chapter 2). As 
Philogène’s (2001) research into representations of black Americans and African Americans has 
vividly illustrated, “when new circumstances force us, as a group or a community, to rethink the 
present and imagine the future as part of adjusting to a changing reality” we develop to new or 
‘anticipatory representations’ (p. 128). Hence, as Hall would say, the politics of representation 
always provokes a struggle over meaning and therefore is always unfinished.  
 
Our psychological capacity to imagine alternative futures is highlighted by Moscovici in his 
original study (1961/2008, p. xxxi): 
Social representations is an organised corpus of knowledge and one of the psychical 
activities that allow human beings to make physical and social reality intelligible, to 
insert themselves into groups or day-to-day relations of exchange and to free the 
powers of their imagination.  
 
What are important here are the notions of exchange and imagination. As Hall has pointed out, 
communication cannot be seen as a top-down dissemination or a process were the informed 
elite (scientists, the church, heads of social institutions, media gurus) inform the masses (see 
chapters 2 and 14); this is simply one side of communicative exchange where particular 
meanings are encoded. Communication is always unstable and unpredictable because these 
meanings are decoded in constantly shifting and oppositional ways. We should (perhaps rather 
hopefully) see communication as an imaginative exchange that potentially leads to a qualitative 
change in all parties involved. As Moscovici argues “Communication is never reducible to the 
transmission of the original messages, or the transfer of data that remains unchanged. 
Communication differentiates, translates and combines” (2008, p. xxxii). Similarly, Hall proposes 
that we look for moments of negotiation, struggle and “imaginative resistances” where people 
express their discontent and agency, develop new identities and propose alternative social 
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relations (1960). While otherising representations can be internalised and so pose a threat to 
identity and esteem (box 7.2), our intrinsic psychology and communicative capacities for 
dialogue, debate and critique, bring to the fore the possibilities for social and political 
psychological change (box 7.3). Hence communication involves ‘the double movement of 
containment and resistance’ (Hall, 1981) or a ‘double orientation’ (Marková, 2000) that invites 
and contests different versions of reality through the interconnected social psychological 
processes of representation and identification. Hence, while representations always stem from 
somewhere and bring with them ideological connections to previous systems of knowing, 
identifying and excluding, they are simultaneously dynamic and open to be elaborated in new, 
transgressive ways.  
 
An articulated account of representation founded on both Hall and SRT draws attention to these 
dialectics and demands an integrated theory of the complex connections between psychological 
processes, relations of power and the potential for resistance contained within and invited by 
communicative exchange. SRT is profoundly useful as it highlights the cultural and ideological 
nature of the psychological processes that sustain communication. Hall’s work deepens a more 
political reading of representation and presents an important reminder that “cultural meanings 
are not only ‘in the head’. They organise and regulate social practices, influence our conduct 
and consequently have real, practical effects” (1981, p. 3). Hence, I suggest, a Social Psychology 
of communication requires such an articulated account of representation that highlights the 
ways in which communication is itself always ideological, collaborative, agentic, potentially 
imaginative and transformative.  
 
 
References  
Abric, J.-C. (1993). Central System, peripheral system: their function and roles in the dynamic of 
social representations. Papers in Social Representations, 2(2), 75-78. 
Augoustinos, M. and Riggs, D. (2007) Representing ‘Us’ and ‘Them’: Constructing white 
identities in everyday talk. In Moloney, G. and Walker, I. (eds) Social Representations and 
Identity: Content, Process and Power. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Bakhtin, M. M. (1981). The dialogic imagination: four essays. Austin, University of Texas Press. 
Batel, S. and Castro, P. (2009) A Social Representations approach to the communication 
between different spheres: an analysis of the impacts of two discursive formats. Journal 
for the Theory of Social Behaviour, online early view.  
Bird, S. R. (2009) Light, Bright and Damned Near White. Westport: Praeger.  
Bennett, J.M. (1993) Cultural marginality: Identity and issues in intercultural training. In R.M. 
Paige (Ed) Education for the Intercultural experience, pp. 109 – 136. Yarmouth, ME: 
Intercultural Press.  
Cieslik, A. and Verkuyten, M. (2006) National, Ethnic and Religious Identities: Hybridity and the 
case of the Polish Tatars. National Identities, Vol. 8 (2), pp. 77 – 93 
Crocker, J. (1999) Social stigma and self-esteem Situational construction of self-worth. In Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 35, pp. 89 – 107.  
Deaux, K. and Wiley, S. (2007) Moving people and shifting representations: Making immigrant 
identities. In Moloney, G. and Walker, I. (eds) Social Representations and Identity: Content, 
 17 
Process and Power. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Durkheim, E. (1898). Representations indivuelles et representations collectives. Revue de 
Metaphysique et de Morale, 6, 273-302. 
Duveen, G. (1994). Children as Social Actors: A Developmental Perspective on Social 
Representations. In P. Guareschi & S. Jovchelovitch (Eds.), Testos sobre representaces 
sociais. 
Duveen, G. (2000) The Power of Ideas. In Moscovici, S. Social Representations: Explorations in 
Social Psychology. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Duveen, G. (2008) Social Actors and Social Groups: A return to heterogeneity in Social 
Psychology. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. 34 (4), pp. 369 – 374. 
Duveen, G., and Lloyd, B. (1986). The significance of social identities. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 25, 219-230. 
Duveen, G. and Lloyd, B. (1990). Social representations and the development of knowledge. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fitch, K.L. (1998) Speaking relationally: Culture, communication and interpersonal connection. 
New York: Guilford Press.  
Gaskell, G. (2001) Attitudes, Social Representations and beyond. In K. Deaux & G. Philogene 
(Eds.), Social Representations: Introductions and Explorations. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Hall, S. (1980) 'Encoding/decoding'. In Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (Ed.): Culture, 
Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972-79 London: Hutchinson, pp. 
128-38 
Hall, S. (1981). The determinations of news photographs. In S. Cohen & J. Young (Eds.), The 
manufacture of news: social problems, deviance and the mass media (Rev. ed., Vol. 
Communication and society; 4). London: Constable. 
Hall, S. (1988). New ethnicities. In K. Mercer (Ed.), Black Film, British Cinema (pp. 27 -31). 
London: Institute for Contemporary Arts. 
Hall, S. (1991). Old and New identities; Old and New Ethnicities. In K. A.D. (Ed.), Culture, 
Globalisation and the World-System: Contemporary conditions for the representation of 
identity. Basingstoke: Macmillian. 
Hall, S. (1997). Representation: cultural representations and signifying practices. London: Sage. 
Hayakawa, S. I. (1978) Through the communication barrier. New York: Harper and Row.  
Holliday, A., Hyde, M. and Kullman, J. (2004) Inter-cultural communication: an Advanced 
Resource Book. New York: Routledge 
Howarth, C. (2002). "'So, you're from Brixton?' The Struggle for Recognition and Esteem in a 
Multicultural Community." Ethnicities 2(2), pp. 237-260. 
Howarth, C. (2002b) Identity in Whose Eyes? The Role of Representations in Identity 
Construction. Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour. 32:2.  
Howarth, C. (2004) Representation and Resistance in the context of School Exclusion: Reasons 
to be critical. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology. Vol. 14, pp. 356 – 377. 
Howarth, C. (2006a). A social representation is not a quiet thing: Exploring the critical potential 
of social representations theory. British Journal of Social Psychology, 45, 65 – 86.   
Howarth, C. (2006b). Race as Stigma: Positioning the Stigmatized as Agents, Not Objects. Journal 
of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 16, 442-451 
 18 
Howarth, C. (2007) “It’s not their fault they have that skin colour, is it?” Young British children 
and the possibility for contesting racislising representations. In Moloney, G. and Walker. I. 
(Eds). Social Representations and Identity: content, process and power. London, Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Howarth, C. (2009a) “I hope we won’t have to understand racism one day”: Researching or 
reproducing 'race' in Social Psychological research? British Journal of Social Psychology.  
Howarth, C. (2009b) Towards a Visual Social Psychology of Identity and Representation: 
photographing the self, weaving the family in a multicultural British community. In Reavey, 
P. (ed) Visual Psychologies: Using and interpreting images in qualitative research. London: 
Routledge. 
Jodelet, D. (1991). Madness and Social representations. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
Kronberger, N. and Wagner, W. (2007) Inviolable versus Alterable Identities: Culture, 
Biotechnology and Resistance. In Moloney, G. and Walker. I. (Eds). Social Representations 
and Identity: content, process and power. London, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lewis, J. (1994). The Meaning of Things: audiences, ambiguity, and power. In J. Cruz & J. Lewis 
(Eds.), Viewing, Reading, Listening: Audiences and Cultural Reception. Boulder: Westview 
Press. 
Marková, I. (2000) Amédée or How to get rid of it: Social Representations from a dialogical 
perspective. Culture and Psychology, 6 94), pp. 419 – 460.  
Marková, I. (2007) Social Identities and Social Representations: How are they related? In 
Moloney, G. and Walker. I. (Eds). Social Representations and Identity: content, process and 
power. London, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Martin, J.N. and Nakayama, T.K. (2005) Intercultural Communication in contexts. London: 
McGraw-Hill.  
Marx, K. (1968) The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, in K. Marx abd F. Engels, Selected 
Works, London: Lawrence and Wishart, originally published in German 1852. 
Miike, Y. (2004) Rethinking humanity, culture and communication: Asiacentric critiques and 
contributions. Human Communication, 7, pp. 69 – 82. 
Moloney, G. (2007) Social Representations and the Politically Satirical Cartoon: The Construction 
and Reproduction of the Refugee and Asylum-Seeker Identity. In Moloney, G. and Walker. 
I. (Eds). Social Representations and Identity: content, process and power. London, Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Moscovici, S. (1961/2008). Psychoanalysis: Its image and its public. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
(First published as La psychanalyse, son image et son public. Paris: Presses universitaires 
de France.) 
Moscovici, S. (1973). Foreword. In C. Herzlich (Ed.), Health and illness: a social psychological 
analysis. London: Academic Press. 
Moscovici, S. (1984). The phenomenon of social representations. In R. Farr & S. Moscovici (Eds.), 
Social Representations (pp. 3 - 69). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Moscovici, S. (2000). Social representations. Cambridge: Polity. 
Moscovici, S. (2001) Why a theory of Social representations? In K. Deaux & G. Philogene (Eds.), 
Social Representations: Introductions and Explorations. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 19 
Moscovici, S. and Marková, I. (2000) Ideas and their development: A dialogue between Serge 
Moscovici and Ivana Marková. In Moscovici, S. Social representations. Cambridge: Polity. 
Orbe, M. (1998) Constructing co-cultural theory: An explication of culture, power and 
communication. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
Painter, D. (2008) The voice devoid of any accent: Language, Subjectivity and Social Psychology. 
Subjectivity, 23, pp. 174 – 187.  
Pavlidou, T.S. (2000) Telephone conversations in Greek and German: Attending to the 
relationship aspects of communication. In H. Spencer-Oatley (Ed) Culturally Speaking: 
Managing rapport through talk across cultures (pp. 121 – 140) London: Continuum.  
Philogène, G. (2001) From race to culture: The emergence of African American. In K. Deaux & G. 
Philogene (Eds.), Social Representations: Introductions and Explorations. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Porter, Richard E. & Samovar, Larry A, eds. (1988). Intercultural Communication: A reader. Fifth 
edition. Belmong: Wadsworth Publishing Company. 1988 
Skeggs, B. (1997) Formations of Class and Gender: Becoming Respectable. London: Sage.  
Tajfel, H. (1978) Social categorization, social identity and social comparison. In H. Tajfel (Ed) 
Differentiation between social groups. (pp. 61 – 76) London: Academic Press.  
Tracy, K. (2002) Everyday Talk: Building and Reflecting Identities. New York: The Guildford Press.  
Wagner, W. and Kronberger, N. (2001) Killer tomatoes! Collective symbolic coping with 
biotechnology. In K. Deaux & G. Philogene (Eds.), Social Representations: Introductions and 
Explorations. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
